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130 abstract
Small business tax compliance requires special attention. On the one hand small 
businesses are often incapable of rigorously fulfilling their tax obligations, more 
vulnerable to external risks and tempted to exploit opportunities to be non-compli-
ant. On the other hand, unlike larger businesses, they are usually sole proprietors 
or owner-operated businesses, hence highly responsive to personal, social, cogni-
tive and emotional factors. These attributes pave the way to a better use of meas-
ures designed to influence their behavior and choices. This paper discusses the role 
and effectiveness of tax penalties in enhancing tax compliance in small businesses. 
It argues that tax penalties, although indispensable for tax enforcement, may not be 
a first-choice tool in ensuring tax compliance. Too punitive a tax regime is an im-
portant barrier to business formalization and increasing severity of tax penalties 
does not produce the intended results. To be effective, tax penalties should deter 
and motivate taxpayers rather than exert repressive measures against them.
Keywords: tax penalties, tax enforcement, SME’s tax compliance, SME taxation 
1 IntRoDUctIon
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are an important part of the taxpayer 
population in any country around the globe. Their taxation usually poses a number 
of challenges. They are numerous but contribute relatively little to the state coffers, 
while often absorbing a large share of scarce tax administration resources much 
needed elsewhere in administering the tax system. Moreover, low levels of tax 
compliance are observed among SMEs, particularly among the self-employed, thus 
further reducing potential tax collections and increasing the tax administration ef-
fort (Engelshalk 2004; OECD, 2009; 2014). Many countries address these issues 
by adopting simplified tax regimes for SMEs and implementing dedicated compli-
ance strategies (IFC, 2007; OECD, 2009; Crawford and Freedman, 2010). While 
the primary objective of a well-designed simplified tax regime is to improve effi-
ciency of small businesses taxation, by reducing both compliance costs and tax 
administration effort, the compliance-enhancing strategies aim at the inclusion and 
more efficient use of different administrative instruments that allow more taxpay-
ers to be brought into the tax net, encourage existing taxpayers to voluntarily fulfill 
their tax obligations, and ultimately to create a widespread culture of paying taxes. 
There is a whole universe of measures that may be used to boost tax compliance. 
Presumptive taxation, less onerous tax obligations, including reduced frequency 
of filing and tax payments, use of third party information, IT solutions, and open 
communication with taxpayers are just a few examples (Thuronyi, 1998; Chen et 
al., 2002; Engstom et al., 2006; OECD, 2009; 2010; Swistak, 2015). Tax penalties 
also play a role – from deterrence to motivation and correction of improper behav-
ior of taxpayers (Wenzel, 2004; OECD, 2010; Poppelwell, 2012). 
None of these measures give satisfactory results if implemented alone. They are 
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131may be, and usually are, a very important part of this mix (Devos, 2004; Pop-
pelwell et al., 2012). They may be powerful in influencing taxpayer behavior but 
never should they be seen as a primary or a stand-alone tool (Tyler, 2006; OECD, 
2010). As noted by Matthews (2005) the myth of punitiveness has long been 
shattered. Tax penalties have the potential to work better if used as an auxiliary 
means of delivering and implementing a sound compliance strategy. It is thus 
important that policy makers and tax administrators have a good understanding 
of the nature of tax penalties. Otherwise their negligence or overuse may become 
commonplace. 
Yet, it is not only the extent to which traditional tax penalties are used that defines 
the overall quality of taxation and behavioral responsiveness of taxpayers. Certain 
tax design features and tax administration actions may also be punitive for taxpay-
ers. As such they become an important part of the discussion on tax penalties, or 
– to put it broadly – the punitiveness of the tax system (Wenzel, 2004; Kirchler et 
al., 2007; OECD, 2010). 
Therefore, there are important questions to be answered: Does tax compliance in 
small businesses require special attention? If so, how important are tax penalties 
in enhancing and enforcing it? In what ways do they influence taxpayers’ behav-
ior? To what extent may they affect business informality? And, how punitive 
should the tax regulations be?
This article provides for a brief overview of the role of tax penalties in tax compli-
ance in small businesses and aims to answer the above questions. First, it dis-
cusses the potential of tax penalties in driving tax compliance in SMEs. Then it 
discusses objectives and forms of tax penalties and follows with a brief elabora-
tion on the severity of tax penalties and alternatives to their use. The final section 
offers concluding thoughts as well as a few practical guidelines for the effective 
use of tax penalties. 
2 WHY PenaltIes MatteR In sMe taXatIon
Taxation of SMEs poses different challenges from larger businesses. There are 
several reasons why the size and structure of businesses matter in tax compliance. 
Small businesses, in most cases sole proprietors or owner-operated incorporated 
companies, may lack the capacity properly to fulfill their tax obligations, even 
more so if these are onerous (Evans et al., 2005; Engstom et al., 2006). Not many 
small entrepreneurs can or want to afford professional tax services and, instead, 
they rely on themselves. However, the low awareness of tax obligations1, coupled 
with relatively slower adjustment to tax law changes, commonly leads to mistakes 
1 Small businesses may lack not only understanding of specific tax obligations but also the basic nature of 
taxes. A value added tax is a primary example. Small businesses often perceive VAT as a tax on the profits 
they make, not as a tax on final consumption. Without in-depth knowledge of the VAT mechanism they may 
be inclined to avoid registering for VAT even if it would be beneficial for them. By “hiding” behind the VAT 
registration threshold they themselves add to evasion and – by breaching an invoice trail – provide further 
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132 and delays in tax calculations, reporting and payment (McKerchar, 1995; Coleman 
and Freeman, 1997). The vulnerability of small businesses to changes in market 
conditions further increases the risk of involuntary non-compliance. Any expo-
sure to trade shocks (e.g. a temporary ban on exports) or backlog of payments for 
supplied goods and services (e.g. delays in payments by a general contractor to its 
subcontractors) may easily result in a temporary cash flow-insolvency (Kitching, 
2011; Ogawa et al., 2012). Since small businesses, unlike large companies, have 
also limited options in securing additional funding, e.g. accessing bank credit, 
they may be unable to pay their taxes promptly (Ayadi and Gadi, 2013; Darvas, 
2013; ECB, 2013; Ozturk and Mrkaic, 2014). 
The risk of voluntary non-compliance is also higher in the case of small busi-
nesses (Cowell, 2003; Slemrod, 2004; Crocker and Slemrod, 2005). Many SMEs, 
even if incorporated, are managed by the owners. Unlike professional managers 
or accountants in large companies, they do business using their own capital and 
have different interests in its use. Their personal risk-aversion may be lower as 
any gains arising from tax evasion directly accrue to business manager-owners. 
For this reason they are more sensitive to changes in the financial situation, unfair 
treatment by tax administration or simply tempted by existing opportunities. Un-
questionably, there are more opportunities for small businesses to be non-compli-
ant than for larger ones – they can use cash transactions, disguise their private 
consumption as business inputs, or hide actual wage payments (Cowell, 2003; 
Engstom et al., 2006). By doing so they manipulate their sales, margins, profits, 
and even taxable wages paid to their employees. More importantly, it is easier for 
them not to be formalized at all. Specific tax concessions available for small busi-
nesses offer further avenues for tax abuse, e.g. hiding below the eligibility thresh-
old in a presumptive tax (OECD, 2009). 
Apart from penalties associated with non-compliance there are other risks that 
have an impact on small businesses. Unlike large enterprises, they are prone to 
abusive actions enforced by tax administration (e.g. excessive audits, lengthy and 
impeded tax procedures, unjustified certification requirements, corruption). Such 
actions although not strictly classifiable as tax penalties may be seen as penalizing 
in a broader sense and discourage compliance (McClellan, 2013). 
Tax design also matters. Onerous tax obligations, multiple taxes, high tax rates 
and overall complexity of tax laws pose much of a challenge for small businesses. 
Even if these challenges give rise to the introduction of some special concession-
ary measures (e.g. less frequent filing and tax payments, cash flow accounting or 
presumptive taxation) not all risks are eliminated. Some measures are conditional 
(e.g. taxpayers in good standing only) and limited (e.g. turnover threshold, em-
ployment limits, exclusion of specific activities) so there is a need for a constant 
observance of eligibility criteria, adding to the existing risk of abuse (Thuronyi, 
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133As pointed out above, the risks of being non-compliant are numerous. At the same 
time, small businesses due to their size and personal characteristic are more sus-
ceptible to corrective stimuli than large businesses. This suggests that behavioral 
measures, including tax penalties, are of great relevance for enhancing tax compli-
ance in small businesses.
3 taX PenaltIes as a coMPlIance DRIVeR
3.1 econoMIc DeteRRence MoDel
In many countries revenue bodies seem to rely on increased checks and severity 
of penalties as the main vehicle for enforcement of taxes. The established convic-
tion of the effectiveness of this approach goes back to the economic deterrence 
model, developed by M. Allingman and A. Sandmo (1972). 
The model assumes that rational taxpayers base their decisions purely on economic 
calculation. If they expect that costs of evasion are higher than benefits received as 
a result of it, they will comply. If the expected costs of evasion are lower than the 
expected benefits they have no incentive to be compliant. Therefore, it is enough to 
check taxpayers more frequently and impose more severe penalties to limit tax eva-
sion. This approach, in its simplicity, seems to be very convincing. However, no tax 
administration has the capacity frequently to check all taxpayers and impose severe 
penalties. Rational taxpayers may well factor this into their calculations and choose 
to continue evading taxes. In addition, practice does not confirm the theory – there 
is much less tax evasion than the model would imply. Other factors, sociological 
and psychological, for instance, determine actual levels of tax compliance. 
Therefore, revenue bodies should be compelled to shift from reliance on the clas-
sical economic deterrence model to a better understanding of taxpayer behavior 
and the provision of incentives for boosting tax compliance. This does not mean 
that tax penalties are no longer important. They are still necessary but need to be 
used in a well-informed way and supplemented with other actions and strategies. 
Tax penalties are just one of the many factors that drive taxpayer compliance. 
Other drivers include risk aversion, personal and social norms, opportunities, fair-
ness and trust and economic factors (OECD, 2010). Reliance only on tax penalties 
is thus not effective. To achieve the best results, the knowledge of taxpayer behav-
ior is critical, yet extremely complex. As is the relationship between tax penalties 
and tax compliance (OECD, 2010; Poppelwell et al., 2012). 
3.2 VolUntaRY Vs. non-VolUntaRY coMPlIance
It is important to distinguish between involuntary and voluntary non-compliance. 
Taxpayers already willing to comply are not likely to be motivated through tax 
penalties. In fact they may feel discouraged if unjustly punished. Voluntarily non-
compliant taxpayers are also not a homogenous group – some of them cheat oc-
casionally, some do it on a regular basis by taking advantage of existing opportu-
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134 Different strategies are needed to foster voluntary compliance and enforce tax 
laws. Improving the climate of doing business and paying taxes does not require 
reliance on tax penalties whereas dealing with detected cases of tax offenses would 
be difficult without them. Elimination of excessive tax obligations, streamlining 
tax administration processes, support and trust are likely to give better results. 
As mentioned above, the relationship between tax penalties and tax compliance is 
complex. Tax penalties may have both positive and negative impact on taxpayers. 
If tax penalties are fair and acceptable they strengthen taxpayers’ compliance. If 
they are perceived as oppressive they are likely to create resistance and result in 
even more non-compliance. 
Also, deterrence does matter. Not all taxpayers respond to this element in quite the 
same way. Recent OECD research (2010, 2012) found that tax penalties have 
greater deterrence impact on taxpayers who assess risk and severity of penalties as 
high, are not driven by a moral obligation to comply, and perceive the high social 
cost of non-compliance and notice that non-compliant taxpayers are being caught 
and punished. This underscores the fact that understanding personal characteris-
tics of taxpayers and behavior patterns is a key challenge. It also calls for a strong 
and trustworthy tax administration that undertakes effective actions to create a 
sense of unavoidability and fairness of tax penalties. If taxpayers see that those 
who are non-compliant are not punished it harms their morale. It is then important 
to penalize non-compliant behavior not only to deter and motivate a given tax-
payer but also to convey a message to the general public that such behavior is not 
acceptable. The effectiveness of revenue bodies in this domain builds trust and 
creates a very important social norm, i.e. paying taxes is the right thing to do. 
Dealing with experienced fraudsters requires a slightly different approach. Detec-
tion and punishment of a single tax offence may create an illusion of security – those 
taxpayers may believe that lightning never strikes the same place twice and continue 
their fraudulent practices. In such a case the deterrence of tax penalties is compro-
mised and repetitive actions are required – up to fining those taxpayers out of busi-
ness. As noted above, the consistency and effectiveness of the tax administration is 
crucial for the general perception of fairness and the creation of social norms.
3.3 taX PenaltIes anD bUsIness foRMalIzatIon
Tax penalties may drive not only tax compliance of registered businesses but also 
be a barrier to business formalization. Naturally, there are other reasons for busi-
nesses to operate in the informal sector. Burdensome regulations, multiple and 
high taxes, labor law requirements, bureaucracy, corruption, etc. are traditionally 
cited as primary hurdles. Tax penalties just further add to this list. 
The impact of tax penalties on business formalization is not uniform. Penalties may 
be seen at two extremes – as a barrier to formality or an invitation to informality. 
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135ministration. The number of tax obligations itself translates into higher risk of non-
compliance and associated punishment. If this is coupled with a heavy reliance on 
penalties in tax enforcement actions a dire disincentive is created for business for-
malization. It becomes even bigger if penalties are unrelated to actual infringements 
or are used for purposes of corruption. Small businesses may choose to stay in the 
shadow to avoid any obligations and potential contact with the authorities. If they 
risk anything, it is the possibility of being detected and punished – but only once. 
Tax penalties may also be seen as an encouragement to informality. This is due to 
poor design of tax penalties or poor performance of the tax administration. If the 
deterrence effect is not big enough or the tax administration is too weak to enforce 
penalties, businesses may prefer to stay in the shadow, not believing that they are 
in any danger. 
A sound system of tax penalties should be therefore seen as one of the vehicles of 
incentivizing business formalization. It has a significant potential to influence tax-
payers’ choices, even more so if coupled with the removal of other barriers and 
adverse incentives (e.g. onerous tax obligations). The high efficiency of a tax ad-
ministration in the enforcement of tax penalties is crucial, as is the support offered 
to taxpayers in their efforts to be tax registered and compliant. Without a strong 
trust in the tax administration and their conduct, including the trust in the fairness 
of penalties used, no incentives offered to small businesses to step out of the 
shadow economy are likely to be effective. Mutual trust helps in the building of 
strong social norms. Without those norms, no compliance strategy, which tax pen-
alties are a part of, may give satisfactory results. 
In designing a strategy for business formalization, lawmakers and tax administra-
tion should focus on a few core elements. Businesses ought not to be worse-off 
when formalized, there should be little or no risk that they will end up paying 
more penalties than when they are informal, the odds of being detected and pun-
ished must be very high and the penalties enforced need to be substantial as com-
pared to those applied to businesses that are formalized but prone to making mis-
takes. To increase the deterrent effect and social acceptance, prompt and firm en-
forcement of tax penalties is also crucial. On balance, strong support should be 
offered to formalized business. Certain rewards (e.g. training, temporary forgive-
ness or well targeted concessions) are of additional benefit.
Yet, not all revenue bodies focus enough on the informal sector. Little research is 
done on country-specific reasons for a large informal economy, actual taxpayers’ 
segmentation or existence and potential impact of social norms. Many countries 
lack comprehensive strategies, including studies on the possibilities of best em-
ployment of tax penalties in addressing business formalization and boosting tax 
compliance. Tax administrations, especially in emerging economies, find it easier 
to focus on known businesses, ignoring those invisible to them. Apart from fiscal 
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136 taxes becomes widespread and engulfs more and more businesses, even those 
potentially willing to be compliant. 
The experience of Poland, although not exceptional, may be instructive by show-
ing deficiencies in designing and delivering a sound compliance strategy for small 
businesses. Box 1 gives an overall picture of how much needs to be done to ef-
fectively tackle existing challenges, many of which have a historical and cultural 
background. Poland is a high-income country still strengthening its democratic 
traditions and the rule of law after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. The troubled 
history and long-standing non-democratic regime, where one had to cheat, ma-
neuver and avoid authorities to get by, greatly loosened once-strong social norms 
and imprinted a stigma on the culture of paying taxes (Majka, 2010). Even nowa-
days, non-compliant taxpayers are not condemned by society. In many cases they 
are seen as those who have the brains to play the system. It is the tax administra-
tion that is blamed for being oppressive even if its actions are necessary and justi-
fied (Debowska-Romanowska, 2008). 
Box 1: Poland – deficiencies in compliance strategy and use of tax penalties
–  No comprehensive research on taxpayers’ segmentation and behavior and impact 
of personal and social norms.
–  No tax gap measurement, limited compliance data analysis, little data on informal 
economy size and structure.
–  No comprehensive strategy on tax administration of SMEs (some scattered 
measures exist, e.g. limitation on length and number of audits).
–  Little communication and few campaigns (though some distinct actions have been 
recently undertaken, e.g. the media campaign “Take a receipt”, promoting VAT 
compliance).
– No specific deterrence strategy.
–  Heavy reliance on tax penalties, barely any alternatives are used. 
–  Fines keep increasing, currently up to USD 1,000 (though usually lower ranges 
are used).
Source: Ministry of Finance’s documents (www.mf.gov.pl); Action Plan for Improved Tax 
Compliance and More Effective Tax Administration: 2014-2017 (http://www.mf.gov.pl/docu-
ments/764034/1161625/pakiet_dzialan_podatkowych.doc); author’s analysis.
Such a heritage, most likely relevant to other countries of the former Eastern Bloc, 
creates a great challenge for a tax administration and requires a tremendous effort 
to put tax compliance back track and match the levels observed in the developed 
world. A strong commitment to research and sound analysis of the current struc-
ture of compliance strategies, including the structure and use of tax penalties, is 
needed. Yet, in Poland, there is very little of this.
Such a phenomenon may only be partly explained by the tax authorities’ capacity 
constraints. The other factors entail insufficient awareness of the challenges, lim-
ited experience in applied behavioral economics, and more importantly – the lack 
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1374 objectIVes anD foRMs of taX PenaltIes 
A tax is a compulsory unrequited payment to general government.2 It is unrequited 
in the sense that benefits provided by the government to taxpayers are not in pro-
portion to the payments they make. Since there is no direct benefit, taxpayers are 
naturally resistant to the payment of taxes. The resistance differs amongst taxpay-
ers but is largely commensurate with the overall tax burden and the quality of 
taxation and also the perception of government spending efficiency. 
Unquestionably, the higher the acceptance of taxes, the easier the task for the tax 
administration to collect them. It would be too optimistic, however, to rely only on 
taxpayers’ inner conviction that “paying taxes is a right thing to do”. Legal coer-
cion and sanctions are still necessary to enforce taxation. Obligations have to go 
hand in hand with sanctions (Ripstein, 2004). Otherwise they would become a 
classic lege imperfecta, an unimaginable approach in the public finance domain 
(Dębowska-Romanowska, 2008).
The critical question therefore is not whether sanctions should be used but what 
they should be like. Although there is no universal answer to it, two basic features 
emerge. First, a tax penalty should influence taxpayers’ behavior – prevent non-
compliance and induce compliant demeanor in the future. Second, it should be 
more painful than fulfillment of a given tax obligation, yet not repressive.
The preventive aspect of tax penalties lies mainly in deterrence (Wenzel, 2004; 
OECD, 2010; Majka, 2010). Taxpayers choose to comply with their tax obliga-
tions rather than paying more than the cost of obligation or losing potential tax 
benefits (e.g. tax concessions). However, it is only true if they know what the 
consequences of non-compliance are, find it unprofitable to cheat and believe they 
may be detected. 
Tax penalties also motivate taxpayers. First, they may educate them, but only if 
tax penalties are fair and unavoidable. Certainty of being detected and punished is 
the prerequisite for taxpayer education (Frey and Feld, 2002; Torgler, 2007). The 
other is fairness of penalties applied. If they are too lenient taxpayers may find it 
beneficial to be non-compliant again. If they are too strict taxpayers may find them 
too oppressive and unacceptable and are likely to choose playing the tax system, 
even if they did not do it before. Second, tax penalties may contribute to the crea-
tion or promotion of social norms. If tax penalties are perceived as fair by other 
taxpayers they build up a sense of justice and reward those complying. At the 
same time a clear message is sent out – “paying taxes is a right thing to do”, “tax-
payers are honest – only those few non-compliant are punished”. Such norms 
strongly motivate taxpayers, especially individual small businesses, to be compli-
ant about their tax obligations (Torgler, 2007; Poppelwell et al., 2012).
2 Although there is no common consensus on treatment of other charges, fees and social security contribu-
tions taxpayers are likely to perceive them as taxes, even if there is a direct benefit for these payments (e.g. 

































40 (1) 129-147 (2016)
138 As noted above, tax penalties are not fair if they are too lenient. They are punitive 
only if taxpayers find them more painful than fulfillment of a given tax obligation. 
Therefore, in any tax penalty there must be a reasonable financial meaning – 
again, mostly to deter and motivate tax compliance. Tax penalties, unlike criminal 
penalties, should not aim at repression (Majka, 2010). The society still needs en-
trepreneurs to pay their taxes in the future – it should not be interested in severe 
penalties leading to business closure. This is naturally different in the case of 
fraudulent businesses. If serious crime is involved, tax penalties should lead to 
cessation of such an activity. For example, if small businesses register for VAT 
only to take advantage of fraudulent VAT refunds, the tax administration has a 
vested interest in the ultimate closure of such businesses. There are neither fiscal 
nor social benefits from allowing those businesses to operate. Severe penalties 
may be used in achieving this goal. 
Tax penalties should not be imposed for revenue generation purposes (Debowska-
Romanowska, 2008). The overarching goal of a well-designed and administered 
tax system is to create a situation where all taxpayers are compliant and no penal-
ties are actually used. In this sense no government should count on the revenue 
from tax penalties. Any proceeds received are a mere consequence of imperfec-
tions both on taxpayers and the tax administration’s side. They should be treated 
as a last resort measure to correct for those imperfections. By no means are tax 
penalties an effective revenue source. Increasing proceeds from tax penalties 
should be interpreted as an indicator of declining quality of taxation rather than of 
the effectiveness of the tax administration. It should encourage the government to 
undertake necessary actions to bring voluntary compliance and sound tax admin-
istration practices back on track. 
Compensation is also not an objective of tax penalties (Majka, 2010). Any pay-
ment made by taxpayers to compensate the budget for loss of revenue (e.g. inter-
est paid on tax arrears) is not a tax penalty. If compensation does not exceed the 
limits of the harm done (loss of revenue) there is no element of pain and it should 
be seen as a mere restitution, not a tax penalty. Yet, in many cases taxpayers may 
perceive it this way. 
There is a whole universe of tax penalties – from standard fines administered by 
revenue bodies to more sophisticated measures like increased tax rates, additional 
tax payments, etc. Some other actions and solutions, even if unintended, may also 
be punitive for taxpayers.
The most commonly used form of tax penalties is fines. They are administered by 
revenue bodies, without courts’ intermediation, whenever a case of non-compli-
ance is discovered. They may be set forth in laws as fixed amounts or, less often, 
imposed in relation to taxpayer’s income, profits, turnover, value of business as-
sets, or any other easily observable factor. Seldom are they related to actual tax 
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139payment, e.g. lack or delayed notifications, deficiencies in tax accounts. Second, 
fines are typically administered immediately after non-compliance is detected, 
without unnecessary delay. It would require a thorough examination of every case 
for a tax administration to determine the amount of tax not paid as a consequence 
of non-compliance.
Other forms of tax penalties may involve increased tax rates and additional tax 
liabilities (e.g. additional VAT payment calculated as a percentage of under-de-
clared tax). Incrementally increasing interests on tax arrears (depending on the 
ageing of outstanding payments) are also penalizing in nature – if they exceed 
regular interests on tax arrears. 
Legal qualification of tax penalties may be irrelevant for taxpayers. They may 
perceive as a tax penalty any measure that is a consequence of breaching a tax 
obligation, resulting in a disadvantageous economic situation as compared with 
the situation where no such obligation was breached. Legal coercion is usually 
associated with sanctions. However, there may be sanctions where coercion is 
absent. Revocation of tax concessions and denial of certain rights illustrate this. If 
a taxpayer enjoyed a simplified form of taxation or accelerated depreciation and 
this is taken away from him there is certainly an element of pain, comparable to 
that stemming from a traditional tax penalty.
Traditionally only the measures that were enacted with a clear view to provide a 
degree of pain to non-compliant taxpayers would be recognized as tax penalties. 
Some measures, however, even if not intended to be punitive, are tax sanctions in 
effect.3 There are numerous examples of tax design that either directly penalize 
taxpayers or induce non-compliance and make taxpayers vulnerable to traditional 
penalties. The first group may involve, for instance, lack of opt-in opportunities 
for small business choosing to be taxed under presumptive tax or lack of voluntary 
registration for VAT purposes. Small taxpayers may choose to be taxed under 
presumptive tax but after some time they may find it not beneficial to continue to 
do so (e.g. their margins drastically fall and taxation of turnover is excessive as 
compared to taxation of actual income under the general tax regime). If the elec-
tion of presumptive taxation is fixed in time and switching to the general tax re-
gime is not possible, small businesses are forced to pay higher tax. In this case it 
represents a penalty for them. Similarly, although the vast majority of small busi-
nesses find it beneficial to be exempt from VAT, some of them (e.g. exporters or 
those supplying mainly to VAT registered taxpayers) may be vitally interested in 
registration. If they are not allowed to do it they are penalized – they need to ac-
cept lower margins to remain competitive. 
3 It is not the aim of this article to discuss tax policy measures that may be punitive – intentionally, e.g. to dis-
courage consumption of certain goods (excises on tobacco or alcoholic beverages), or unintentionally, e.g. by 
providing tax credits to married couples with children, single and childless taxpayers are punished or by tax-
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140 The second group of tax design solutions that may have a punitive impact on tax-
payers encompasses excessive tax obligations and the quality of tax law. Exces-
sive reporting requirements, short terms for fulfilling tax obligations, dispropor-
tionate conditionality of tax concessions are often not justified but add to compli-
ance costs. In this sense they may be perceived as a penalty, even more so if con-
trasted with the option of staying in the informal sector. Lack of clarity of tax 
provisions and frequent changes of tax laws further complicate fulfillment of tax 
obligations. Such features of tax design and legislation may induce non-compliant 
behavior – if taxpayers are not aware of their obligations or have little time to act 
they are more likely to make mistakes and cause delays, exposing themselves to 
traditional tax penalties.
Improper actions of revenue bodies may be also seen as tax sanctions and a sig-
nificant impediment to doing business (Silvani and Baer, 1997; IFC, 2007; Mc-
Clellan, 2013). Incorrect tax decisions, faulty advanced rulings, lengthy tax ap-
peals, frequent audits, delayed payments of VAT refunds, etc. add uncertainty and 
increase the costs of business. As such they are an indirect penalty. If no compen-
sation is paid as a result of faulty actions of revenue bodies (e.g. interests on de-
layed VAT refunds, compensation for incorrect tax decisions, etc.) they become a 
genuine tax penalty – even more painful than traditional penalties. 
Tax penalties may have a significant impact on business economics. They increase 
business operating costs not only by the amount of penalty paid but also by the 
associated costs of proceedings and appeals, if applicable. Since tax penalties, and 
rightly so, are not deductible for income tax purposes they affect the post-tax rate 
of return. Fixed lump-sum payments or penalties expressed as percentage of turn-
over or value of assets have different meaning for businesses with distinct profit-
ability. If not adjusted properly they are regressive. 
 
5 seVeRItY of taX PenaltIes 
The probability of being detected and punished seems to be more of a deterrent 
than the sheer severity of penalty (Tullock, 1974; Majka, 2010; OECD, 2010; 
Poppelwell, 2012). If taxpayers see that it is more and more difficult to remain 
uncaught (e.g. due to risk-based and better targeted audits, or more sophisticated 
IT solutions) they may find it risky to continue evasive practices. If they can only 
observe increases in potential tax penalties they will not be more afraid than they 
were before. Indeed, there is not much difference between a 50, 70 or 90 percent 
penalty tax rate; or between a USD 5,000 and a USD 6,000 fine for a small entre-
preneur. All those penalties seem to be equally in their detterent effect or irrele-
vant for taxpayers. Their responsiveness to increased levels of potential tax penal-
ties is not proportional. 
Making tax penalties more and more severe has therefore no real impact on tax-
payers’ behavior. This is not to say that tax penalties do not require revisions. They 
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141a comprehensive review of the penalty system, then periodical reviews to make 
sure that the catalogue and levels of penalties respond to changes in business envi-
ronment, economy, society and culture. The experience of the UK may be instruc-
tive. In 2008 HMRC embarked on a review of their sanctions for late or non-filing 
and payment, as part of their compliance strategy improvement (HMRC, 2008).
Tax penalties actually imposed certainly matter for taxpayers and society. On one 
hand they have to be painful enough to discourage non-compliant behavior. On 
the other hand they need to be acceptable, fair and not repressive. Limits for tax 
penalties are difficult to set (Debowska-Romanowska, 2008; Majka, 2010). Again, 
there are key roles for policymakers and revenue bodies to play in this exercise. 
They first have to design a proper catalogue, forms and limits for tax penalties. 
The latter have to pick the right penalty if there is some room left for the revenue 
body’s discretion. 
It is impossible to give a definitive answer to what a perfect penalty should be. 
However, some basic directives for effective penalties may be formulated.
First, they have to be painful enough to void any cost-benefit calculations on the 
taxpayer’s side. Fulfillment of a tax obligation must be more advantageous for 
taxpayers than the option of being non-compliant. Taxpayers have to respect the 
financial needs of the government and predictability of its revenue streams. It is 
widely accepted that taxpayers may not use unpaid taxes as a source of revenue 
for financing their business activity. Interests on tax arrears are a primary instru-
ment that prevents such situations and compensate the government for late pay-
ments. Tax penalties, e.g. fines and incremental increases in interest rate on tax 
arrears beyond the standard rate, are just an additional form of safeguarding due 
payments. It is the role of tax penalties to make non-compliance unprofitable and 
painful. Assessment of understated tax and payment of interest is not disadvanta-
geous as this is only restitution of what should be paid and compensation for loss 
of time value of money.
Second, they may not be too harsh or destructive. Excessive repression never 
worked, not only in the area of taxation. Experience of the Eastern Bloc is instruc-
tive. Communist regimes imposed draconian penalties for any form of non-com-
pliance, and yet evasion was widespread (Majka, 2010).
While setting up a fair penalty, a balance has to be struck between the desired 
painfulness and non-repressiveness. It means that a fair penalty has to take into 
account other factors. It has to recognize the type of non-compliance. It would be 
inaccurate to punish occasional mistakes and voluntary cheating in the very same 
way. The type of breached tax obligation also matters – late filing is different from 
underestimation of tax. Most importantly, however, a fair penalty has to be ad-
justed to taxpayer’s ability to pay. A USD 100 fine has a different meaning for a 
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142 have different margins. Similarly, a 10 percent penalty based on turnover would be 
a different share of the actual business’ profitability largely varying across sectors.
The law needs to provide for a reasonable list of potential violations and indicate 
the range of a potential penalty or penalties. It does not have to be excessively 
casuistic, i.e. foresee every possible type of non-compliance and circumstances of 
violation. Indication of a fixed amount of fine is also not a good solution. A range 
or at least an upper limit, especially in case of fines expressed in amounts, not 
percentages, seems to be a good approach. It leaves a certain level of discretion for 
the revenue body with regards to both qualification of a given violation and actual 
penalty imposed, thus allowing it to choose a right and fair penalty in given cir-
cumstances. In countries where the tax administration is weak a positive indica-
tion of tax violations along with the limits of an applicable tax penalty allows 
confining – at least to some extent – the abusive actions against taxpayers.
The other challenge is the use of an IT system in administration of tax penalties. 
IT systems are an integral part of a modern tax administration and in fact they are 
indispensable for the efficient monitoring of taxpayer compliance. If used for 
verification of fulfillment of taxpayer obligations (e.g., late or non filing, required 
notifications, tax payments, etc.) they easily pick up non-compliant taxpayers. 
They may be programmed to impose a fine (or other penalty) automatically in 
every single case of non-compliance identified and notify taxpayers without any 
intermediation of the officials of the revenue body. This vastly speeds up admin-
istrative processes and reduces not only the amount of work otherwise to be com-
pleted by the revenue body’s employees but also the risk of abusive actions on 
their part. However, such a process may appear to be “soulless” and contradict the 
idea of a fair penalty. Unless there is a “wise” algorithm in use, i.e., an algorithm 
capable of taking into account most relevant circumstances (e.g. a newly set up 
business, first late filing or payment), a verification of the penalty imposed is nec-
essary – if not beforehand, then through a simplified appeal. 
Escalating a tax penalty for a late fulfillment of tax obligations (e.g. filing) may 
partially add fairness to the system of tax penalties. If the purpose of a late-filing 
penalty is to encourage timely filing of a tax return, or at least to encourage its 
filing as soon after the due date as possible it seems equitable to gradually increase 
the penalty amount – the later the obligation is met the more unpleasantness tax-
payers suffer. The actual design of such incremental penalties – a surtax on tax due 
or a flat amount – would largely depend on the capacities of the tax administration 
and taxpayers’ responsiveness to tax penalties (IMF, 2004). 
6 alteRnatIVes to taX PenaltIes 
Reliance on tax penalties in the enforcement of taxpayers’ obligations is ineffec-
tive if not supplemented with other actions and measures. An increased severity of 
penalties is of no avail either. Therefore, there is a need for a comprehensive treat-
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143enhance tax compliance in less distortive and more supportive way. It is the old 
sticks and carrots dilemma – how much of each to use to have the best possible 
results. No easy answers may be offered; however, there are reasons to believe 
that the balance should tip to the latter. Even though this is challenging, some op-
tions do exist.
Tax authorities may find it beneficial to use indirect and direct alternatives to tax 
penalties. Indirectly, it may encourage tax compliance by providing more support 
to small businesses, especially start-ups, and by building trust through its profes-
sionalism, effective communication, training and technical support (Silvani and 
Baer, 1997; Hadler, 2000). This way the need for imposing penalties decreases 
and they may be used as a last resort, i.e., where other measures fail.
If non-compliance is detected a warning should be considered where possible, as 
a direct alternative to a tax penalty. Apart from deterrence, such warnings may 
exhibit a degree of support. On the one hand they signal to the taxpayer that tax 
authorities are watching and may take further actions if the case of non-compli-
ance is not reversed corrected (deterring effect). On the other hand they let a tax-
payer know that a mistake was made and that it requires his attention (supportive 
effect). If the taxpayer neither takes corrective action nor seeks the tax administra-
tion’s assistance in solving the problem, the tax administration has to be deter-
mined to use and be able to enforce a fair tax penalty.
The use of communications and spot checks is also deterrent in nature (OECD, 
2010). Occasional communications via Internet website, e-mails, and other media 
on planned campaigns (e.g. verification of seasonal business in summer or winter 
resorts) may well discourage taxpayers from taking advantage of existing oppor-
tunities. Occasional checks in general may have similar effects to a tax penalty if 
used responsibly. Too frequent checks of a compliant taxpayer may be perceived 
as oppressive and give opposite results, i.e. lower levels of compliance. If a sanc-
tion is justified non-monetary penalties may be considered. They include a degree 
of unpleasantness but do not affect directly business economics – there is no pay-
ment involved. Publication of non-compliant taxpayers (“name and shame”), en-
forcement of mandatory compliance courses, or higher levels of the scrutiny may 
be just as painful and deterring as traditional tax penalties.
Lawmakers may also contribute to a lesser use of tax penalties. Apart from assur-
ing transparency and simplicity of the tax law, balanced tax obligations and well 
targeted concessions for small businesses. they may consider adopting a number 
of “rewards in law”. These specific solutions motivate taxpayers to be compliant 
in order to get other benefits, e.g. deductibility of invoiced expenses only, clear tax 
records to participate in public procurement, renew business license or even to 
register a car, a good compliance record to benefit from accelerated VAT refund 
payments, etc. In all likelihood taxpayers will value those rewards more than a 
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144 7 conclUDInG tHoUGHts 
Tax compliance in small businesses requires special attention. On one hand they 
are often not able to fulfill all their tax obligations, more vulnerable to external 
risks (e.g. economic shocks, unfair competition, lack of transparency, and abusive 
actions) and tempted to use different opportunities to be non-compliant. On the 
other hand, unlike larger businesses, they are usually sole proprietors or owner-
operated businesses, being thus highly responsive to personal, social, cognitive 
and emotional factors. These attributes pave the way to a better use of measures 
designed to influence their behavior and choices. Tax penalties are one of the be-
havioral measures that may be effectively used in addressing tax compliance chal-
lenges. Through deterrence, motivation, fairness and the creation of desired social 
norms they may drive taxpayers’ choices and therefore play a significant role in 
encouraging business formalization and enhancing tax compliance.
To achieve this goal, lawmakers and tax administrators should be well aware of a 
few important attributes and challenges of tax penalties. The first to note is that tax 
penalties are important and still needed. They sanction improper behavior of tax-
payers and facilitate enforcement and collection of taxes. However, they give best 
results if used as a supplement to other drivers of taxpayer compliance – the tax 
administration should not rely on tax penalties only. Too punitive a tax regime or 
administration is an important barrier to business formalization and a disincentive 
to tax compliance. Widespread penalties counteract creation of positive social 
norms and a culture of paying taxes. 
Second, tax penalties should be designed to deter and motivate taxpayers, rather 
than repress or raise additional revenue. Tax penalties even if used for securing tax 
revenue should not be seen as source of revenue itself.
Finally, increasing the severity of tax penalties does not work – fairness and prompt 
enforcement is of much greater importance, also to reassure the compliant majority 
that the tax administration treats non-compliance seriously. Tax penalties, if neces-
sary, have to be painful but not blind – they have to take into account an individual 
taxpayer’s situation, at least type and reason of non-compliance, and taxpayer’s 
ability to pay. Late notification of change of address should not be punished as 
much as under-declaration of tax. Also, a fixed lump-sum penalty has different 
meaning for businesses with distinct profitability. Other instruments may work bet-
ter than tax penalties; lawmakers and tax administration – wherever possible – 
should make use of other deterrent instruments (e.g. checks, warnings, communi-
cations), non-monetary penalties and “rewards in law”. Supportive actions and 
building trust in the tax administration may also foster tax compliance. After all, 
the effective use of tax penalties requires knowledge of taxpayer’s segmentation, 
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